







We analyze optimal ﬁscal, monetary and exchange rate policy in a
simple small open econonomy model with price setting frictions. We
perform our analysis in the tradition of optimal dynamic Ramsey prob-
lems. We characterize optimal allocations and the government policies
that implement the optimal allocation.
1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to provide a theoretical framework to char-
acterize optimal ﬁscal, monetary and exchange rate policy in a small open
economy model with varying degrees of price setting restrictions. The contri-
bution of this paper is to carry on the analysis following the dynamic Ramsey
literature. Thus, the mapping from policies to allocations is derived from a
fully articulated dynamic general equilibrium monetary model with taxes.
An important consequence of this approach is that we can jointly study op-
timal ﬁscal and monetary policy. In addition, the explicit introduction of
preferences provides a natural welfare criteria to evaluate policies.
We consider a model in which a fraction of ﬁrms is restricted to set prices
one period in advance and characterize the optimal cyclical properties of
the Ramsey solution. For this economy, we ﬁrst extend results derived in
Correia, Nicolini and Teles (2001a) and show that the set of implementable
allocations is independent of the price setting restrictions. Thus, the optimal
allocation under sticky prices is the same as the optimal allocation under
ﬂexible prices. We then show that the cyclical properties of optimal short
run monetary policy depend on the nature of the shock driving the cycle.
Except in strange cases, if the boom is caused by a shock to the technology
of ﬁnal goods (non-tradables), optimal monetary policy must be procyclical
1and a devaluation must follow; if it is driven by a technology shock to
intermediate goods (tradeable), optimal monetary policy is countercyclical
and the exchange rate must decrease. Finally, if the boom is induced by an
international terms of trade shock, optimal monetary policy is procyclical
and the exchange rate depends on the source of the term of trade shock: if it
is driven by a decrease in the price of importable, the exchange rate must be
revalued, while if it is driven by an increase in the price of exportables, the
exchange rate must be devalued. Another remarkable result is that neither
optimal allocations nor the policy instruments that implement it depends
on the degree of price stickiness.
There is an extensive literature that studies optimal monetary and ex-
change rate policies and characterizes it in terms of its cyclical properties.
Obviously, this properties do depend on the mapping from policies to allo-
cations that is derived form the particular model used and on the welfare
criterion used. Most of the literature has used reduced form models not
explicitly derived from preferences and technologies. Our results will diﬀer
form most of the literature, sometimes because of the particular model we
use, sometimes because of the welfare criteria used.
The model we analyze is very simple. As such, it has at least two weak-
nesses we want to discuss. First, as most of the modern literature, we
impose ad-hoc restrictions on the price setting process, instead of modelling
the price setting decision and deriving the optimal price setting rules. Thus,
we take as a fundamental parameter the fraction of ﬁrms that can adjust
prices within the period. Thus, the model is subject to the Lucas critique,
and this raises doubts of its usefulness for policy analysis. We do not view
this as a signiﬁcant problem, since we show that both the optimal allocation
and the optimal policy are independent of that assumed fundamental para-
meter. Thus, potential changes in the parameter due to changes in policy
will not alter our conclusions regarding optimal policy.
Second, a model as simple as this one is not able to replicate the evidence
of open economies, particularly at the business cycle frequency we will be
focusing on. Why performing optimal policy exercises in models that are
not able to match the data?. This is indeed a serious shortcoming, but there
does not seem to be obviously better choices available. We went ahead with
the analysis, despite this issue, for two reasons: ﬁrst, we hope that the
intuitions we unravel here will prove useful to understand the workings of
monetary and ﬁscal policy in models that can replicate observed patterns
for aggregate variables at business cycle frequencies, if these do exhibit price
stickiness and second, we want to explore the implications of price setting
restriction for the conduct of optimal ﬁscal and monetary policy in open
2economies, above and beyond the empirical relevance of this restrictions in
explaining real time dynamics. Since many times policy advice is oﬀered
based on the alleged workings of models with sticky prices, clarifying the
ways these models work was, for us, a natural question to raise.
The characterization of optimal monetary and exchange rate policies is
an old time question. There also seems to be a certain consensus with respect
to the way the nominal exchange rate ought to be managed given shocks such
as government spending, real exchange rate or productivity shocks. On the
other hand, these questions have only very recently started being addressed
in general equilibrium dynamic models. The policy implications derived
form the models we analyze are at odds with the conventional wisdom many
times. In addition, some of those policy implications do not appear robust
to small changes in the environment. Our ﬁrst, very simple approximation
suggest that general equilibrium economics does not seem to support the
conventional wisdom in all dimensions.
2T h e e c o n o m y
Our model economy follows closely the structure in Correia, Nicolini and
Teles (2001a) modiﬁed to allow for international trade along the lines sug-
gested by Rebelo (XXX).
The economy consists of a representative household, ﬁrms that produce
an exportable intermediate input, a continuum of producers of ﬁnal goods
indexed by i ∈ [0,1], and a government. Each ﬁrm in the ﬁnal goods sector
produces a distinct, perishable consumption good, indexed by i.
The state of the economy will be represented by the realization of a
random process σt ∈ Σ that follows a ﬁrst order Markov process with sta-
tionary transition function. For simplicity, we will assume that there exist a
density function µ(σt+1 |σt) describing the law of motion of σ.T h es h o c k s
to the economy will be time invariant functions of the state. The economy
faces the following shocks: government expenditure shocks, Gt = G(σt),t w o
types of productivity shocks, to the ﬁnal consumption good s
y
t = sy(σt) and
to the intermediate (exportable) good sx
t = sx(σt). In addition, we will let
policy instruments to be functions of the state. That is, labor income taxes
τn
t = τn(σt), dividend taxes τd
t = τd(σt), consumption taxes τc
t = τc(σt),
taxes to foreign contingent claims τ∗(σt), non-negative lump-sum transfers
T (σt) (e.g. social security), money supplies Mt = M(σt) and exchange rate
εt = ε(σt). These are all the natural policy instruments to consider in this
environment.
3We model monetary policy as a mapping from the state of the economy σt
to the positive real numbers, M(σt) for t ≥ 0. As in any rational expectations
version of sticky price models, the eﬀects of anticipated or unanticipated
monetary policy are very diﬀerent. Therefore, it is convenient to introduce
the following notation. Let
M(σt)=M(σt−1)µ(σt−1)δ(σt), where
Et−1 [δ(σt)] = 1
which implies
Mt = Et−1[Mt]=M(σt−1)µ(σt−1)
Thus, we identify the expected rate of money change between time t−1 and
t with µ(σt−1), while δ(σt) represents the state contingent deviation on the
rate of money growth. In the same way we decompose the exchange rate in
an expected element ε(σt−1) a n da nu n e x p e c t e ds h o c kζ(σt).T h a ti s ,
ε(σt)=ε(σt−1)ζ(σt)
with Et−1ζ(σt)=1 , so Et−1 (εt)=ε(σt−1)
We assume that the economy is open to international trade, as well
as to the international credit markets. The intermediate good is traded
internationally and is produced with labor, the sole input, with a constant
returns to scale technology. The consumption goods are assumed to be
non traded in international markets and are produced using labor and two
intermediate inputs, one home produced and the other produced in the
rest of the world. The international price of both intermediate inputs are,
respectively, Px∗
t and Pm∗
t . The law of one price holds for both tradable
goods. The economy is fully integrated in world capital markets and the
price of foreign assets will also be allowed to depend on the state, z∗(σt+1,σt)
so we can analyze the optimal response of policy to these shocks.
3 Households





βtU (Ct,1 − Nt)
￿
(1)











The timing of events is taken from Lucas and Stokey (1987): assets markets
open at the beginning of the period. After all trading takes place, assets
markets close until the beginning of the next period and the rest of the
markets open. And at the end of the period households receives their labor
income and dividends that can be used to buy assets or consumption goods
the next period.
Households start period t with outstanding nominal wealth, Wt,a n d
decide to buy money balances Mt and Bh
t+1 units of money in nominal
bonds that pay Rt+1Bh
t+1 units of money one period later. They also buy
Zh
t+1(σt+1) units of one-period state contingent nominal securities promis-
ing one unit of money in the next period conditional on the state σt+1 being
realized, whose nominal price, normalized by the probability of the state
σt at t,i sg i v e nb yz (σt+1|σt).T h e yc a na l s ob u yAt+1(i) units of stocks
of ﬁrm i, that cost at(i) in units of currency. Households have to pay ﬂat




respectively. Notice that since there are complete markets, risk free bonds
a r er e d u n d a n t ,h o w e v e rw ew i l li n t r o d u c et h e mt ob ea b l et ot a l ka b o u tt h e
Friedman rule and other monetary policies more clearly. To avoid cumber-
some notation, we will keep the argument σt implicit in most of the paper,




t the international price of the home produced
and imported intermediate inputs in units of foreign currency, respectively.
The law of one price holds for both goods, thus, if the nominal exchange rate




t . We assume also that there
exist (redundant) state contingent claims to deliver one unit of the foreign
currency next period, Z∗
t+1, at the price (in units of foreign currency) z∗
t+1,t.
We also assume that the international credit market is inhabited by risk
neutral investors that price the foreign currency contingent claims as
z∗




where, to avoid non-stationary paths of the trade balance, we assume that
β∗ = β.
The purchases of consumption goods have to be made with cash, so we




t)di ≤ Mtvt (3)
where Pt(i) is the money price of ﬁnal good i and vt is a velocity shock. In a
c a s h - i n - a d v a n c ef r a m e w o r kt h ev e l oc i t ys h o c kc a nbeg i v e nt h ei n t e r p r e t a t i o n
that in each period (and at a particular state σt), a fraction 1
vt of the ﬁnal
g o o d sm u s tb ep a i dw i t hc a s h .
A tt h ee n do ft h ep e r i o d ,t h eh o u s e h o l d sr e c e i v el a b o ri n c o m e ,WtNt
where Wt is the nominal wage rate, and collect dividends, given by current
period proﬁts Dt(i) that can be used to purchase consumption and trade







At+1(i)at(i)di ≤ Wt (4)
Wt+1 = Mt + Rt+1Bh
t+1 +Zh
















The Bellman equation describing the households’ problem is
J (Wt)=m a x{U (Ct,1 − Nt)+βEtJ (Wt+1)}
subject to (2), the cash in advance constraint (3) and the budget constraints






aggregate price index. After rearranging the ﬁrst order conditions, the fol-











Pt (1 + τc
t)
Wt (1 − τn
t )
(Rt+1 + vt −1)
vt
U1−N (t)









































As usual, given that there are complete markets all marginal rates of
substitutions are equalized across agents and they are equal to the price of












We assume that the government has to ﬁnance a strictly positive (contingent-









As part of the deﬁnition of equilibrium, we will assume that the gov-
ernment, acting competitively, takes the prices of the consumption varieties
as given and chooses the demand for variety i, gt (i), so as to minimize the
expenditure to achieve a certain level of Gt. The aggregate level of govern-
ment purchases depends on the realization of the state of the economy σt
and is taken as exogenous, at least by the ﬁscal and monetary authorities.
Thus expenditure minimization implies that the government’s demand for








5P r o d u c t i o n s e c t o r
The production sector of the economy consist of two broad sectors. There is
an intermediate goods sector with ﬁrms that produce competitively an in-
termediate input that can be used locally or can be traded in international
markets with labor as the sole input. On the other hand, there is a sector
7of ﬁnal goods characterized by a continuum of establishments indexed by
some point in the unit interval, i ∈ [0,1], each producing a diﬀerentiated
ﬁnal good, called of variety i. The market structure in the ﬁnal goods sector
is monopolistic competition as developed by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). Each
ﬁrm in this sector uses three type of inputs: labor and two intermediate in-
puts, both traded in international markets. The country has the technology
to produce only one of the intermediate inputs.
5.1 Intermediate goods sector








t is a technology shock and N
y
t is aggregate labor used in the ﬁnal







must hold in equilibrium.
5.2 Final goods sector









where yt(i) is output of the variety i,a n dn
y
t(i), qx
t (i) and qm
t (i) are the
demand for inputs by the ith ﬁrm: labor, home produced and imported in-
termediate inputs respectively. s
y
t is an aggregate technology shock common
across varieties, and the production function F is linearly homogeneous in
the inputs, concave and satisﬁes standard Inada conditions.











where ϕ is positive, globally concave, increasing and linearly homogeneous in
prices and decreasing in s
y
t.N o t et h a ta l lﬁ r m sh a v et h es a m ec o s tf u n c t i o n .
8Furthermore, using the zero proﬁt condition in the intermediate input sector































































t < 0,w ec o n c l u d et h a t
in any equilibrium, the marginal cost of each ﬁrm in the ﬁnal goods sector





















.T h eφ function only depends on












Even though technological possibilities are the same for each ﬁrm, we will
assume that a fraction γ of the ﬁnal goods producers are constrained to set
prices one period in advance, called sticky ﬁrms, while the remaining frac-
tion of ﬁrms are allowed to set state contingent prices, called ﬂexible ﬁrms.
As discussed in the introduction, we agree that this is, indeed, an ad-hoc
assumption as are all other price setting restrictions found in the literature.
Also, it is clear that the fraction γ should be endogeneized. However we will
show below that the optimal policy is independent of this critical parameter,
and therefore, potential movements on γ driven by diﬀerent government’s
actions will not aﬀect the normative claims we will derive.
5.2.1 Flexible ﬁrms
The pricing equation for stocks implies that the problem of maximizing the


























[Pt (i) − MCt]yt (i)









obtained from the households and government problems, where Yt = Ct+Gt .










where the superscript F is used to denote a ﬂexible prices ﬁrm. Flexible
ﬁrms set a common price, a constant mark-up over their common marginal
cost.
>From now on, we will focus on competitive equilibria for which the
relative price zt+1,t is positive. If this is the case, the constraint for positive
production reduces to τd
t ≤ 1. What do we require for zt+1,t to be non-
negative? From the household’s problem and using that in any equilibria
the gross nominal interest rate and the nominal wages are positive (otherwise






≥ 0. And of course,
the relevant case is 1 − τn
t ≤ 0 for all t and states of the world. This
the natural case to work with, since otherwise, the government in at least
one period is giving transfers through labor subsidies. But that will aﬀect
the intertemporal Euler equation. Since the government has access to non-
negative lump-sum transfers, it will be better to transfer resources through
using the latter instrument instead of labor subsidies.
5.2.2 Sticky ﬁrms
Sticky ﬁrms must set prices one period in advance. Even though at time
t the ﬁrms are constrained in terms of the prices at which they can sell,
they are free to choose any level of output. Hence, at time t,a n dg i v e na
previously chosen price, they do choose quantities to maximize proﬁts. That

























0, and yt(i)=0otherwise. That is, as long as they do not make negative
proﬁts, they will produce all that is demanded at the given price.
Prices must be chosen at t − 1, then the manager’s problem will be to



























Taking the ﬁrst order condition, using the intertemporal Euler equation
to replace the contingent price zt+1,t and rearranging we ﬁnd that the pricing



























and S is used to denote a sticky prices ﬁrm.
As Gt > 0, feasibility requires sticky prices ﬁrms to produce positive



















The equation that determines the evolution of net holdings of foreign assets,









where TBt is the trade balance measured in units of the home produced
intermediate good, B∗
t+1 is the amount of non-contingent foreign bonds held
11domestically between t and t+1,a n dR∗
t is the foreign interest rate between





1,0 be the price of one unit of good at time t
contingent on a particular realization of the history of shocks σt =( σt,σt−1,...,σ1 |σ0)
















But using that z∗
t+1,t = βPx∗
t /Px∗




Introducing the last condition in place of Z∗
t above, summing for all
periods and histories σt, and assuming away Ponzi schemes, we obtain the












0 is the initial stock of foreign assets held domestically. Hereafter
we will assume that B∗
0 =0 .
7 Equilibrium
7.1 Equilibrium with price setting frictions:
Given the state of the economy σt, an equilibrium is a set of prices
{Pt,P t(i) ,W t,z t+1,t,R t+1,a t (i),ε t,Px
t ,Pm
t }
for i ∈ [0,1] given P0(i) if i is a sticky prices ﬁrm, a set of allocations
￿

























































and the quantity {Yt}; the prices {Pt (i)} and the quantities {yt (i),n t (i),qx
t (i),qm
t (i)}
solve the ﬁrm’s problem as stated in section 5, depending on the price setting
restriction on the particular ﬁrm.
3. The prices {Wt,Px
t } satisfy the free entry condition in the inter-
mediate inputs sector.
4. Given the prices {Pt,P t(i)} and the quantities {Gt} the govern-
ment chooses {gt (i)} so as to minimize expenditures, as stated in section
4.
5. There are no arbitrage opportunities in international capital mar-
kets.
6. The foreign sector feasibility constraint is satisﬁed.
7. All markets clear. Of particular importance are the following
conditions:














These market clearing conditions assume, without loss of generality, that
no domestic denominated assets is held abroad and that household do not
hold foreign currency denominated assets.
The following proposition will prove useful for solving the Ramsey prob-
lem below:
Proposition 1 In equilibrium the following condition must hold
γyS













where S and F refer to sticky and ﬂexible respectively. Proof: Appendix
8 Implementability conditions
As is usually done in the literature on optimal taxation, the strategy we
will follow is to replace all the agents’ ﬁrst order conditions into the in-
tertemporal budget constraint and a no arbitrage equation in international
capital markets in order to capture the optimality conditions characteriz-
ing the equilibrium in two equations. In other words, we will rewrite the
13intertemporal budget constraint and the no-arbitrage condition in terms of
home allocations, policy instruments and foreign prices.
To roughly capture the idea of taxing capital movements, we will as-
sume that foreign assets receipts are taxed at the proportional rate τ∗
t+1,t.
We are introducing state contingent taxes, equivalent to state contingent
prices. Given the current state, we assume that the government is able to
choose a tax on foreign assets contingent on tomorrow’s state. We will need
this instrument in order to implement the optimal allocation. No arbitrage









The last equation tells us that given the equilibrium prices z∗
t+1,t, zt+1,t and
εt,a tp e r i o dt,i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a ti nt h en e x tp e r i o dt h ee x c h a n g e
rate and/or the tax rate on foreign assets must adjust so as to make the
no-arbitrage condition hold. In particular, if τ∗
t+1,t does not move, then the
equilibrium exchange rate will have to adjust. Interestingly, notice that the
government could manipulate the exchange rate by an appropriate choice of
the tax rate τ∗
t+1,t.
Our task now is to get rid oﬀ prices and write the last equation in
terms of allocations, foreign prices and policy instruments. Using the pricing
equation on foreign assets - pinned down by the linearity of foreign investors,
the ﬁrst order condition with respect to contingent claims, the zero proﬁt
condition in the home produced intermediate input sector and purchasing




















After imposing the equilibrium condition At (i)=1for all i,l e t t i n g
Dt ≡
￿ 1
0 dt (i)di,a n dZt = zt,t−1zt−1,t−2...z1,0, we can integrate forward (4)






PtCt (1 + τc
t) − Tt − WtNt (1 − τn












As mentioned earlier and as done in Lucas and Stokey (1983), we will
introduce all the ﬁrst order condition from the households’ problem and the
ﬁrms’ problem into this equation. In the appendix we show that after doing



















t )(θ − 1)
+
Tt























The last equation summarizes the optimal behavior of the households
and the ﬁrms. Any allocation that can be implemented by some ﬁscal and
monetary policy must satisfy the market clearing conditions, the interna-
tional capital market constraint (9), the foreign sector budget constraint
(7) and the implementability condition (10). Conversely, any allocation that
satisﬁes market clearing, (9), (7) and (10), can be implemented by some
particular ﬁscal and monetary policy.
Interestingly, notice that the last equation does not include the velocity
shocks, and this in turns implies that the optimal policy will be independent
of vt. Also, note that γ, the fraction of sticky ﬁrms appears only in the last
term.



















t )(θ − 1)
+
Tt





Note that the only diﬀerence between (10) and the last equation is in the
last term (i.e. the ﬁrst period). It is sometime argued that with sticky prices
the government has an additional degree of freedom to improve the alloca-
tion with respect to that of a ﬂexible prices economy. We will argue below,
however, that in our framework, this is not true: the additional degree of
freedom given by the ﬁrst period real wage in the sticky prices economy is re-
dundant. I HAVE TO CHECK THIS, SINCE I THINK THAT THE SAME
ARGUMENT THAT WE USE BELOW, USING THE NON-NEGATIVE
LUMP-SUM TRANSFERS, CAN ALSO BE USED HERE: This result de-
pends, however, on our particular price setting assumption. In particular,
if at any moment in time we have ﬁrms with prices ﬁxed by more than one
period in a staggered fashion, it is not that straightforward to obtain the
equivalence result mentioned above. In particular, more policy instruments
are necessary to do it. Thus, in cases where there is a distribution of ﬁrms
with the prices ﬁxed over time, and if the set of policy instruments is small
15enough, there will be, indeed, an additional degree of freedom in the sticky
prices economy relative to the ﬂexible prices economy.
The following proposition states that any allocation that can be imple-
mented by some government policy, can be implemented by another policy
that taxes all dividends in all periods and states of the world.











t+1,t,T t,M t,ε t
￿






t+1,t, ˜ Tt, ˜ Mt,˜ εt
￿
with ˜ τd
t =1that implements the
same allocation.
The last proposition says that any allocation implemented by some par-
ticular government policy can be implemented by another policy that taxes
dividends in all periods and states of the world. In particular, we can re-
strict attention to government policies that tax all dividends. To see why
the last proposition is true, suppose that the government sets a particular
policy with τd
t (σt) < 1 for some period and some state of the world. Since
a change in dividend taxes only aﬀects the equilibrium through changes in
the present value budget constraint of the household, the same allocation
emerges as a competitive equilibrium if we set τd
t =1in all periods and
states of the world and rebate the diﬀerence in the present value of dividend
taxes to the household through lump-sum transfers.
Corollary 3 The set of implementable allocations is the same in a ﬂexible
prices economy and in an economy with price setting frictions, for any degree
of price stickiness γ ∈ [0,1].
This is a straightforward corollary to the last proposition and follows
because the set of implementable allocations between the sticky prices econ-
omy and the ﬂexible prices economy diﬀers only in the constraints (10) and
(11); and we showed that if the government is able to give resources through
non-negative lump-sum transfers, then both constraints are the same.
In order to make the problem interesting, we will assume that the gov-
ernment will have to use distorting taxes to ﬁnance its expenditures. We
introduce the following assumption:
Assumption: In all equilibria that we will focus on, the present value of
dividends is strictly smaller than the present value of government purchases.
T h el a s ta s s u m p t i o ni m p l i e st h a tt h eg o v e r n m e n tm u s tu s eo t h e rd i s -
torting taxes to ﬁnance its expenditures. This in turns imply that in any
16optimal policy the government will set lump-sum transfers to zero in all pe-





βt [UCtCt − U1−NtNt]=0 (12)
9 Solution to the Ramsey problem
In this section we characterize the optimal allocation. Given a stochastic
sequence of government purchases, the government’s problem is to choose an
element from the set of implementable competitive equilibria to maximize
the representative household’s utility. In other words, the Ramsey problem










βtU (Ct,1 − Nt)
￿
















Our strategy will consist in solving a relaxed problem and then showing
that the solution to the relaxed problem can be implemented in the more
restricted environment. First of all, disregard the international capital mar-















t +( 1− γ)yF
t
must hold (but not necessarily vice-versa.) Using proposition 1, we can


























agent’s utility subject to (13), (7) and (12).
17The ﬁrst order conditions are

























where λ,η and βtξt are the Lagrange multipliers on the constraints (12),
(13) and (7) respectively. Note that the optimal allocation is independent of
γ, the fraction of sticky ﬁrms in the economy and of the velocity shocks vt.
















thus, the optimal policy implies PS
t = PF
t = Pt: the government must
manipulate the policy instruments to equalize the state contingent price with






















and then the market clearing conditions (8) are satisﬁed for all i.T os h o w
that the solution to the relaxed problem is the solution of the Ramsey prob-
lem, we must make sure that the international capital market constraint (9)
is satisﬁed for all histories and for all periods. We can always manipulate
the taxes on foreign securities so that (9) is satisﬁed evaluated at any se-
quence of labor taxes, productivity shocks and the consumption and labor
allocation obtained from the relaxed problem. This shows that the solution
to the relaxed problem is indeed, the solution to the Ramsey problem.
The (inﬁnite) set of equations that determines the Ramsey allocation is
given by






18U1−Nt(1 + λ)+λ[CtU1−N,Ct − U1−N,1−NtNt]=ηsx
t (15)



























tφt is increasing in sx
t.1
9.0.1 Example
To obtain more concrete results we will assume that preferences are separable




βt[U (Ct) − V (Nt)]
where H is strictly increasing and strictly concave, and V is strictly increas-













V   (Nt)
￿
1+λ + λ
V    (Nt)Nt




Assuming that the ratios
V    (Nt)Nt
V   (Nt)
and
U   (Ct)Ct
U  (Ct)



















,a n dϕ is increasing in its three ﬁrst arguments and
decreasing in its fourth argument.
2In fact, we need the weaker condition that the left hand side of (17) to be decreasing
in Ct, and the left hand side of (18) to be increasing in Nt.
3When considering comparative statics we mean de following: for example, when
analyzing a higher shock to the ﬁnal goods technology we want to analyze the eﬀects























19• Expenditure shocks are completely insured against in the international
capital markets.
• Shocks to the intermediate input production function alone, reduce
consumption and increase labor.
• Shocks to the ﬁnal good production function and/or shocks to the
terms of trade, d∗
t increase consumption and does not aﬀect labor.
• The Ramsey allocation is independent of the velocity shocks vt.
• T h ef r a c t i o no fﬁ r m st h a tm u s ts e tp r i c e si na d v a n c e ,γ,i si r r e l e v a n t
in the allocation.
It is interesting the conclusion that shocks to the intermediate inputs
sector increase labor and reduces consumption. This shocks determine when
it is good to export and when it is not. Consider, for instance, an increase
in productivity in the intermediate goods sector and assume that goverment
consumption does not change. It is easy to see from equation (16) that the
trade balance must increase for otherwise feasibility would not hold for the
higher shock.
Increases in the ﬁnal goods technology and increases in the terms of trade
increase consumption but does not aﬀect labor; even though consumption
and leisure are normal goods, the ﬁrst remains unchanged when the term of
trade or technology in the ﬁnal goods sector change. Also notice that this
shocks have ambiguous eﬀects on the trade balance.
9.1 Decentralization
As explained above, the existence of sticky prices does not expand the set
of allocations that can be implemented as equilibria. Now we will discuss
particular policies that implement any given allocation. Recall that under
the optimal policy Pt = PS
t = PF
t . Given a competitive equilibrium alloca-
tion the conditions that determine the price system associated with it and






















Pt (1 + τc
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Wt (1 − τn
t )
(Rt+1 + vt −1)
vt
20zt+1,t = β




























In this model we have some redundant instruments; in particular, we
c a ns e ta n yv a l u ef o rt h en o m i n a li n t e r e s tr a t ea n dl a b o rt a x e sa n db e i n g
able to implement the Ramsey allocation. Consequently we will focus on
equilibria where the Friedman Rule holds, i.e. let Rt+1 =1 , and for which
labor taxes are zero for all t a n ds t a t eo ft h ee c o n o m y .W ec h o o s et h i sp a r t i c -
ular normalization to avoid carrying additional notation. As is known (see
Carlstrom and Fuerst, 1995), when the gross nominal interest rate equals
one, the cash-in-advance constraint does not bind, and the model can have
multiple equilibria. We will disregard this subtlety.








































t ζt = Et−1[ωtsx
tφtPx∗
t ζt] (23)
Given the Ramsey allocation and the current state, (19) determines the
(contingent) tax on foreign assets τ∗
t+1,t. Consumption taxes are pinned
21down from the intratemporal condition (20). Regarding monetary policy,
given the allocation and consumption taxes, (22) pins down the unexpected
component of the money supply, δt. And given this function, equation (21)
pins down the expected money growth µt that induces the Friedman rule.
Finally, (23) is used to solve for the unexpected exchange rate shock ζt.
Expected changes in the exchange rate are irrelevant.
Notice that, contrary to the Ramsey allocation, the policies that imple-
ments it do change with changes in velocity shocks vt as shows equation (22),
thus the unexpected money supply shock depends on the realization of the
velocity shock. It must be mentioned, however, that if instead of choosing
Rt+1 =1we would have chosen some other policy, both in (20) and (21)
would have appeared the velocity shocks vt.
It is interesting to notice that in our model, in order to implement the
Ramsey allocation, unexpected monetary and exchange rate policy must be
managed independently. This conclusion does not hold in standard ﬂexible
prices models, where if you decide to manage the money supply, the ex-
change rate is determined endogenously in the model and cannot be freely
manipulated. Or vice versa, if the government runs a particular exchange
rate policy, the model endogenously determines the money supply.
As we noted above, neither the optimal allocation nor the policy that
implements it depend on the fraction of ﬁrms that must set prices in advance.
This is, indeed, an remarkable result.
***********************************************************************************
9.1.1 Example.
CAN WE DO THIS? I’M NOT SURE SINCE A CHANGE IN ONE SHOCK
WILL HAVE AN EFFECT IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF TOMORROW’S
SHOCK AND THEREFORE, TOMORROW’S ALLOCATION (CONSE-
QUENTLY, THE EXPECTED VALUE OF ANY FUNCTION WILL ALSO
CHANGE.) WE DON’T KNOW HOW DOES IT CHANGE, AND THERE-
FORE I THINK THAT WE CANNOT DO THE SIMPLE ANALYSIS WE
DID IN THE PREVIOUS VERSION OF THE PAPER.
SHOULD WE DO SOME NUMERICAL STUFF INSTEAD?
We will characterize the optimal policy in our example with separable
utility from the last section, and analyze how it responds to the diﬀerent
shocks. That is, how the government should manage the monetary and ﬁscal
policy in diﬀerent scenarios about the shocks hitting the economy. Assume
the stochastic processes are such that right hand side of (??) i st h es a m ef o r
22all σ ∈ Σ. For our analysis, we write it as
U1−Nt
sx


















A = δ(σt) (26)














￿ ￿ ￿ < (>)1 . The optimal policy can
be characterized as follows:
• Shocks to the ﬁnal goods technology, sy (σt):consumption in-
creases and labor remains constant. From (24) l a b o rt a xr e m a i n sc o n -
stant. From equation (23), the nominal exchange rate ζt goes up since
φt goes down. Since UCt decreases but φt also decreases, the consump-




￿ ￿ ￿ < 1,t h e nf r o m




￿ ￿ ￿ > 1, δ(σt)
can go up or down. However, a decrease in δ(σt) can be considered
as a strange case, since usually we expect the change in τc(σt) to be
smaller than the change in Ct. Therefore, in general, expansionary
monetary policy must follow. Ireland (1996) also obtains that expan-
sionary monetary policy must be performed when shocks to ﬁnal goods
technology hit the economy, but in a model without distorting taxes.
• Shocks to the home produced intermediate good technology,
sx (σt):labor increases and consumption decreases. >From (??) we
must increase τn (σt) so as to keep the left hand side constant. Since
φtsx
t is increasing in sx
t, we need to decrease the nominal exchange
rate, ζ (σt). As before, we cannot determine how the consumption tax
rate moves, since UCt increases but sx




￿ ￿ ￿ > 1,




￿ ￿ ￿ <
1, δ(σt) c a ng ou po rd o w n . H o w e v e r ,u s i n gt h es a m er e a s o n i n ga s
above, we can consider an increase in δ(σt) as rare. Therefore, in
general, contractionary monetary policy must follow.
• Shocks to the terms of trade, d∗ (σt):consumption increases
and labor remains constant. The labor tax rate goes up or down
as Px∗
t increases or decreases respectively. As with the ﬁnal goods
technology shocks, τc (σt) and δ(σt) c a ng ou po rd o w nd e p e n d i n go n
the parameters, however as before, the more natural case is to increase
the money supply. To derive the optimal exchange rate policy, note
that Px∗















so, if the increase in d∗
t is driven
by an increase in Px∗
t ,t h e nPx∗
t φt increases and the exchange rate
must decrease, while if the shock is caused by a decline in Pm∗
t , Px∗
t φt
increases and a revaluation must follow.
10 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we developed a simple model with varying degrees of price
setting frictions and sought to characterize optimal ﬁscal, monetary and
exchange rate policy following the dynamic Ramsey optimal taxation liter-
ature, and how those allocations and policy instruments should respond to
diﬀerent shocks hitting the economy.
A structural parameter, taken as given, is the fraction of ﬁrms that
cannot set state contingent prices and are constrained to chose its prices one
period in advance. A remarkable result is that neither the optimal allocation
nor the optimal policies that implement it depends on that fundamental
parameter. We also showed that, contrary to what is commonly thought,
price stickiness does not expand the set of implementable allocations. In
other words, the optimal allocation under sticky prices is the same as the
optimal allocation under ﬂexible prices. Furthermore, in order to implement
the Ramsey allocation, the government must run active and independent
monetary and exchange rate policy.
Finally, we showed that the cyclical properties of optimal short run mon-
e t a r yp o l i c yd e p e n do nt h en a t u r eo ft h es h o c kd r i v i n gt h ec y c l e .S h o c k st o
the ﬁnal goods (nontradable) technology call upon expansionary monetary
policy and a devaluation of the exchange rate, shocks to the intermediate
good (tradable) technology require contractionary monetary policy and a
revaluation of the exchange rate, and ﬁnally, shocks to the term of trade
24asks for expansionary monetary policy, and the exchange rate depends on
the composition of the shock: if it is driven by an increase in the price of
exportable goods, the exchange rate must be revalued while if it is caused
b yad e c r e a s ei nt h ep r i c eo fi m p o r t a b l eg o o d s ,t h ee x c h a n g er a t em u s tb e
devalued.
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are function of s
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Wt . The zero proﬁt condi-














t. Thus, the ratio of input demands are, in equi-






























































is independent of i.
Given symmetry, each type of ﬁrms make the same choices (either ﬂexible

































nt (i)di = γn
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t +( 1− γ)n
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w h e r ew eh a v eu s e d(5). Introducing the last equation into (A2) completes
the proof.￿






PtCt (1 + τc
t) − WtNt (1 − τn






















[Zt − (1 − vt)Zt+1] −Z t+1
￿









Now, from the household’s ﬁrst order conditions we ﬁnd that
Zt = βt UC (t)Rt+1
Pt(1 + τc
t)(Rt+1 + vt − 1)
×
P0 (1 + τc
















Rt+1 + vt − 1
￿



















Rt+2 + vt+1 − 1
￿￿









>From the law of iterated expectations, the intertemporal Euler equation,























27Finally, it rests to express the term Dt
Wt in term of the allocations. To this




























































Manipulating the ﬁrst order condition of the sticky ﬁrms and using the law
















































































U s i n g( A 3 ) ,p r o p o s i t i o n1a n dr e a r r a n g i n gw eo b t a i nt h er e s u l t .















































t )(θ − 1)
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and we are done.
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